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Abstract
This paper shows that longer trade times are associated with higher levels of trade-related corruption,
consistent with a theoretical framework in which “fast” producers earn higher profits than “slow”
ones, but may have to pay “speed money” to possibly corrupt customs officials. This finding is robust
to the use of corruption measures based on perceptions and reported behavior, the inclusion of a
wide range of control variables from the previous literature, and estimation by a variety of methods
including instrumental variables. Moreover, results from a gravity model show that the combination
of slow border procedures and rampant corruption acts as a significant drag on international trade,
in line with the model’s predictions: the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to trade time is
around 5% stronger in a country with rampant corruption compared with a corruption free country.
Together, these results suggest that improved trade facilitation can be an effective and feasible policy
for reducing corruption over the short-term in weak institutional environments.
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“I hope to be reborn as a customs official...”
CEO of a successful Thai manufacturing company1
1 Introduction
There is no lack of empirical evidence on the negative effects of corruption in developing countries.
Higher corruption rates have been found to inhibit trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002), as well as
investment and growth (Mauro, 1995). Current policy discourse, as evidenced by the recent controversy
over the World Bank’s new corruption and governance policy, tends to emphasize improved detection and
enforcement capacities, along with a possible role for sanctioning behavior by international organizations,
as the primary policy tools for dealing with corruption in poor countries. However, such an approach in
a sense just re-poses the whole “development question”: if poor countries had strong institutions, or
could develop them quickly and inexpensively, they would probably already have reached a less harmful
corruption equilibrium, as is the case in most developed economies. Similarly, much analytical work on
the causes of corruption tends to focus on deep institutional or cultural characteristics that can only be
changed very slowly (e.g., Treisman, 2000).
This paper takes a different approach. It emphasizes the potential for one particular policy measure–
improved trade facilitation–to reduce the prevalence and negative effects of trade-related corruption.
While obviously not a cure-all for the wide variety of corrupt transactions taking place in many economies,
I show that trade facilitation can nonetheless be of considerable help in dealing with trade-related corrup-
tion. Moreover, trade facilitation policies are relatively quick and inexpensive to implement compared
with fundamental institutional changes.
Customs and border control agencies play a vital gate keeping role at the interface between national
and international markets. Beyond questions of security and public safety, customs officers can have
considerable de facto power to influence the operations of trading firms. In some cases at least, that
power can be abused in order to obtain significant economic benefits–witness the Thai CEO’s eagerness
to change places with a civil servant in the quotation above. As an example of the order of magnitude
1Cited in Svensson (2005).
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of the gains involved, Sequiera and Djankov (2009) find that corrupt payments can represent up to a
600% increase in the monthly salary of a port official in Southern Africa. This paper focuses on “speed
money”–an unofficial payment to customs and border agents in order to “facilitate” speedy clearance of
goods–as one mechanism by which this kind of enrichment might take place, and finds strong evidence
that it is an important and trade-inhibiting phenomenon.
In these days of lean retailing and just-in-time manufacturing, time is becoming ever more important
as a potential trade barrier. Using a gravity model of bilateral trade, Djankov et al. (2008) show that
reducing the time taken to export by one day can increase bilateral trade by around 1%. Hummels (2001)
uses US import data to show that increasing trade time by one day can decrease the probability that
the US sources from that country by 1-1.5%. In the clothing and apparel industry, Evans and Harrigan
(2005) find evidence that patterns of global sourcing from the US are heavily influenced by geographical
proximity, which they interpret in terms of the speed with which goods can be moved between markets.
Although there is already extensive evidence that trading firms are willing to make unofficial payments in
order to evade some kinds of trade-related regulatory burdens, this paper is one of the first to analyze the
links between corruption and trade times. Higher tariff rates have repeatedly been shown to be associated
with higher levels of corruption, as firms are incentivized to make unofficial payments in exchange for
border officers failing to assess duty on imports (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Dutt, 2009). In addition, Fisman
and Wei (2007) show that controls on trading in certain types of goods, such as cultural artifacts, can also
create an incentive to engage in corrupt behavior.
The empirical literature contains some suggestive evidence of a link between corruption and trade times,
based on region-specific surveys of trading firms. For example, Das and Pohit (2006) survey traders
on the India-Bangladesh border, and find that the majority of exporters make speed money payments of
between one and three percent of shipment value; some report paying as much as 10%. In a study of the
ports of Durban (South Africa) and Maputo (Mozambique), Sequiera and Djankov (2009) find that queue
jumping and avoiding storage costs (as well as tariff evasion) are important motivations for many corrupt
transactions.
Against this background, the present paper makes two main contributions. First, it examines for the
first time the links between trade time and corruption in a cross-country framework. It thus builds on
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the region-specific surveys discussed above (Das and Pohit, 2006; Sequiera and Djankov, 2009), as well
as previous cross-country work on the determinants of corruption that focuses on different explanatory
variables, particularly tariffs (Dutt, 2009). Using data for over 100 countries, I show that there is a strong,
significant, and robust link between longer trade times and more trade-related corruption.
Second, the paper uses a gravity model to provide additional evidence on the links between trade times
and corruption through their combined effect on bilateral trade flows. Results strengthen those from the
cross-country regressions: corruption and trade time are both negatively associated with bilateral trade,
as is their interaction. These findings are in line with those of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)–who do
not use an interaction term–and Dutt and Traca (Forthcoming) who interact corruption with tariff rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I sketch out a simple conceptual framework that
highlights the links between official trade times and corrupt payments. Section 3 presents data on cor-
ruption and trade times, and conducts a preliminary analysis using nonparametric methods. In Section 4,
I conduct cross-country regressions of the determinants of trade-related corruption, and undertake exten-
sive robustness checks covering country samples, potential omitted variables, and estimation methods.
Section 5 presents a gravity model of bilateral trade, and uses it to provide corroborating evidence for the
cross-country regression findings in Section 4. Section 6 concludes, discusses policy implications, and
presents some avenues for further research in this area.
2 Conceptualizing Speed Money
An incentives-based model of corruption provides a useful framework for understanding the political
economy of speed money, and developing a number of testable hypotheses (cf. Bardhan, 2006). In this
section, I present the model informally in order to make the intuition clear.2 Full details are set out in the
Appendix. In essence, the model combines the “lean retailing” framework of Evans and Harrigan (2005)
2Of course, the model presented here focuses on just one mechanism–responsiveness to demand shocks–that can make
lower trade time valuable, and thereby lead to corruption. Another possible mechanism could be the gains from being part of
a transnational production network, access to which is only possible for firms that can ship goods quickly. Time sensitivity of
the goods exported, for instance due to perishability, could also create a similar dynamic. Alternatively, reliance on imported
intermediates could be combined with demand uncertainty and inventory costs. I leave it to future work to examine these
possibilities in more detail.
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with a simple rent-sharing model of bribery. The basic mechanism is straightforward. The ability to
produce and ship goods more quickly is commercially valuable to firms, since it enables them to respond
more fully to demand shocks. However, customs agents play a gatekeeper role because they control the
speed with which goods can move from producers to consumers. Corrupt customs agents can extract a
“gift” from firms looking to use the fast track, reflecting the commercial value of speed to producers.
Previous theoretical work on corruption and trade has largely focused on the case of tariffs rather than
time. For example, Dutt and Traca (Forthcoming) develop a model in which officials choose endoge-
nously between extortion or evasion behaviors, driven in part by the prevailing level of tariffs. The setup
in the model presented here differs from theirs in that I focus on the value of trade time to producers rather
than the value of avoiding tariffs, and constrain the behavior of officials to reflect the evasion paradigm
only. In the broader literature on corruption, Ades and Di Tella (1999) emphasize the importance of
rents, using natural resources or imperfect competition in product markets as examples. I consider a
different source of rents, namely the difference in expected profits that comes from enabling faster deliv-
ery times. Lui (1985) and Batabyal and Yoo (2007) consider bribery in the context of a queuing model.
Different opportunity costs of time across individuals drive selection into bribery. The model presented
here abstracts from queuing theory, but provides some micro-foundations for the existence of different
opportunity costs of time that lead firms to self-select into those that pay speed money, and those that do
not.
2.1 Model Setup
There are two firms, each of which is a monopolist with an identical inverse demand curve. Both firms
are located in the same country, but produce goods exclusively for export (i.e., local demand is zero).
Firm location is exogenous and fixed. Their export market can be considered an aggregate “rest of the
world” region with no fixed or variable trade costs between any countries. Labor is the only factor of
production, and is in perfectly elastic supply at the prevailing wage rate (normalized to unity).
Firms maximize the expected profits from sales over two periods. Demand in each period is stochastic.
Low and high demand realizations occur with fixed probabilities. Output can be stored costlessly between
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periods, but inventory left over at the end of the second period has zero value.
The only difference between the two firms is the rate at which they can produce and ship goods to the
rest of the world. One firm (“slow”) can only produce and ship once in a two period model cycle. The
other firm (“fast”) can produce and ship twice over the same time frame. Being fast is advantageous,
since demand is realized twice in the model, and a fast firm can therefore respond more fully to demand
shocks than a slow firm. As in Evans and Harrigan (2005), the ex ante expected profit functions of both
firms are increasing in the variance of demand, but the rate of increase is more rapid for the fast firm.
To be able to export its goods more frequently than the slow firm, the fast firm must deal with customs
agents, who control access to the export “fast track”. Some of these officials may be corrupt, and will
require the fast firm to make a gift (“speed money”). The fast firm therefore faces higher expected
production and shipping costs than the slow firm, since it must incorporate the probability of having to
deal with a corrupt customs official, and the amount of speed money that would have to be paid in that
case.
For customs agents, the decision whether or not to be corrupt (i.e., accept speed money) is made endoge-
nously at the beginning of the model cycle. An individual customs agent balances a certain wage income
from being honest against an uncertain wage and gift income from being dishonest. The uncertainty in the
latter case arises from there being a fixed probability that the official’s corrupt conduct will be detected
and punished, in which case she earns zero. The model assumes that officials also gain utility through
an “honesty bonus”, in which there is a subjective psychological or social gain from following rules and
“doing the right thing”. The honesty bonus is distributed randomly across customs agents according to a
given distribution. The proportion of customs agents who are corrupt is given by the proportion of that
distribution falling below the minimum level of honesty bonus consistent with optimal refusal of speed
money.
Finally, the model assumes that if the fast firm must deal with one of the customs agents who is corrupt,
then the official has full bargaining power. As a result, the speed money that she is able to extract
amounts to the full difference in ex ante expected profits between the slow and fast firms. This is the
highest possible level of gift that is consistent with the fast firm not making a loss.
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2.2 Equilibrium
By analogy with Evans and Harrigan (2005), the model’s timing is as follows:
1. Customs agents decide whether or not to be corrupt, and choose the “gift” required in order to
secure quick passage of goods through customs.
2. Firms decide how much to produce.
3. Period 1 demand is realized, and firms decide how much to sell in period 1. Unsold production is
carried over costlessly to period 2.
4. The fast firm produces again. The slow firm does not.
5. Period 2 demand is realized, and firms decide how much to sell in period 2. Unsold production is
discarded.
As shown in the Appendix, the model can be solved by backwards induction. Equilibrium consists of a
vector of parameters summarizing optimal levels of production and sales by both firms, the amount of
the gift required by corrupt customs agents for fast track treatment, and the proportion of customs agents
who are corrupt. At the margin, customs agents are indifferent between being corrupt or honest, and the
ex ante expected profits of the slow and fast firms are equalized.
2.3 Comparative Statics and Testable Hypotheses
The model’s equilibrium structure and comparative statics provide a number of interesting, and testable,
predictions as to the factors that influence trade-related corruption. (Comparative statics are discussed in
detail in the Appendix.) First, the incentive for the payment of speed money in this model comes from
the ability of the fast firm to respond more fully to overseas demand shocks, and thereby to have higher
ex ante expected profits than the slow firm. It is thus the existence of a delay–reflected in the inability of
the slow firm to produce and ship twice per cycle–and the ability of customs agents to circumvent such
delays for the fast firm, that drives the existence of a corruption equilibrium. The existence of time delays
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facing traders should therefore be associated with the prevalence of trade-related corruption. This is the
core hypothesis of interest in this paper, and it is tested using cross-country data in Section 4.
Second, the model suggests that a country’s governance characteristics have a role to play in reducing
trade-related corruption prevalence. In terms of the theory, an increased probability of detection and
punishment are associated with less prevalent corruption. Two aspects of this linkage are tested using
cross-country data in Section 4, namely: that increased government effectiveness, in the sense of stronger
bureaucratic controls and improved law enforcement, are associated with less prevalent corruption; and
that increased voice and accountability of office holders, which makes denunciation of corrupt activity
more likely, is also associated with less prevalent corruption.
Third, there is also a link between corruption prevalence and cultural attitudes, in particular the average
premium that individuals place on honesty or “doing the right thing”. A higher level of cultural intoler-
ance of corruption is associated with a lower level of corruption prevalence. Again, I test this hypothesis
using cross-country data in Section 4.
In addition to these directly testable hypotheses, the model also suggests another way of examining the
links between corruption and trade time based on their effects on international trade flows. The Appendix
shows that the effect of corruption on bilateral trade depends on the extent of the difference in ex ante
expected profits between the fast firm and the slow one in the absence of corruption. This, in turn, depends
on the level of time delay affecting the slow firm, and which the fast firm circumvents. As a result, the
model suggests that the interaction of corruption and trade time should be a significant determinant of
bilateral trade flows, and should carry a negative sign. I test this hypothesis using a gravity model in
Section 5.
3 Data and Non-Parametric Analysis
The theoretical framework presented above suggests an empirical model in which trade-related corruption
is a function of the set of incentives facing customs agents and traders. The importance of trade times,
governance, and cultural attitudes has already been highlighted. In the empirical work that follows, I
therefore postulate:
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corruptioni = f (timei,govt.e f f ectivenessi,accountabilityi,culturei,ei) (1)
where ei is a random error term satisfying standard assumptions.
After first presenting two empirical measures of trade-related corruption, this section discusses data on
each of these factors in turn, and presents some preliminary evidence of their links with corruption. (See
Table 1 for a full listing of data and sources.)
3.1 Corruption Data
The most common empirical approach to measuring corruption has been to use perception indices.3 A
number of such indices are available, for instance from Transparency International or the World Eco-
nomic Forum. Although differing in the details, the approach for all perception indices is basically simi-
lar. Company executives, or another group thought to have first hand knowledge of corrupt transactions,
are asked to rate corruption according to a numerical scale. Individual responses are then aggregated up
to the country level, usually by averaging. The advantage of these data is that each index is usually main-
tained by one organization over a substantial period of time, so the questions asked of survey participants
tend to remain quite similar from one year to the next. As Ades and Di Tella (1999) point out, these
data do not suffer from the comparability problems that can arise when using law enforcement data, for
example due to differing legal definitions of corruption. Another advantage is that these indices are usu-
ally available for a relatively large number of countries. However, there are also a number of difficulties
in relying exclusively on perception indices as a measure of corruption on the ground. It can be diffi-
cult to distinguish genuine cross-country and year-on-year variation in corruption from statistical noise,
due to the sampling error inherent in the use of survey data with a limited number of participants, as
well changes in the identity of participants from one year to the next. Nonetheless, recent work by Olken
(Forthcoming) and Fisman and Wei (2007) confirms that there is some degree of correspondence between
perceptions of corruption and reality on the ground, albeit one that is subject to numerous caveats and
3Alternative approaches to analyzing corruption include: inference based on trade data (Fisman and Wei, 2004; 2007);
firm-level surveys with binary response or quantitative data on corrupt transactions (Svensson, 2003); direct observation
(Olken and Barron, Forthcoming); and experiments (Olken, 2007).
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limitations.
In line with previous work, the main empirical results in this paper are based on perception data. I
use a survey question from the World Economic Forum (WEF) Executive Survey that asks respondents
to use a one to seven scale to indicate how commonly firms in their industry give irregular payments
or bribes in connection with import and export permits. I rescale these data so that a response of one
corresponds to “never”, and seven corresponds to “commonly”. Due to the specificity of the survey
question used, this index should suffer as little as possible from the measurement error that can plague the
use of corruption indicators like the Transparency International index which are not specific to particular
sectors or activities.
I also perform a robustness check using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey (WBES).
Since all other factors that I am interested in vary at the country level, I aggregate the WBES data to give
the percentage of respondent firms in each country indicating that a gift or informal payment was asked
for or expected to obtain an import permit. Although this kind of measure inevitably poses its own dif-
ficulties, in particular the possibility of under-reporting due to a perceived risk of punishment, previous
work suggests that firms tend to be reasonably forthcoming in practice (Svensson, 2003). For the pur-
poses of this paper, the most pressing constraint in relation to the WBES data is in fact country coverage:
only 71 countries have usable data for this survey question, compared with 121 for the WEF perception
index. Nonetheless, Figure 1 suggests that in so far as the two measures overlap, they appear to be cap-
turing some common features of reality: the simple correlation coefficient between the WEF measure (in
logarithms) and the WBES measure is 0.45 across 57 observations.
3.2 Trade Times
Djankov et al. (Forthcoming) introduce a new database of trade times, assembled under the auspices of
the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) project. They collect data from 345 freight forwarders in 146
countries on the average time it takes to import or export a standard 20-foot container of goods in 2005.
Respondents are given a detailed hypothetical setting out the nature of the goods and firms involved, as
well as their location. They are asked to respond on the basis of the average time taken to complete all
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official procedures required to move the goods from a factory in the most populous city to a ship at the
most accessible port. The trading process is broken down into stages, and respondents are asked to supply
information on cost, time, and the number of documents involved in each step. Extensive quality control
is undertaken, including follow up calls with all respondents to ensure consistent coding, and comparison
with data supplied by port authorities and customs officials in 48 countries.
It is important to highlight that the DB data are intended to capture only the official times involved in
importing and exporting. They are not intended to track the actual times that firms face on a day-to-
day basis, which are highly likely to be contaminated by the influence of corruption in many countries.
Assuming that the influence of corruption and bureaucratic harassment have been purged from the data
in so far as possible, the DB data should represent something close to a firm’s outside option when
dealing with customs officials, i.e. the time that importing or exporting would take in the absence of any
corrupt activity. To stress this point, Figure 2 plots the DB import time data against survey data from the
World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and WBES datasets. The LPI/WBES data represent the
median import time reported by firms in a standard survey, and are based on actual experience rather than
official requirements. Even taking account of the fact that the two data sources measure slightly different
concepts–customs clearance times (LPI) versus total import times (DB)–it is remarkable that in all cases,
the DB import times are substantially higher than those actually reported by surveyed firms. This is fully
consistent with the interpretation just given of the difference between the two, and suggests that the DB
data should be relatively free of the impact of corruption; in any case, this is an issue I return to in the
context of robustness checks (see below), where I conduct instrumental variables regressions to deal with
this possibility more thoroughly.
To get a preliminary idea of the relationship between trade times and corruption, I perform a non-
parametric regression using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Lowess). The dependent variable
is the WEF corruption index, and the independent variable is the average of DB export and import times
(both in logarithms). Results in Figure 3 clearly support the core hypothesis of this paper, namely that
higher trade times are associated with more corruption. The relationship between the two variables is
consistently upward sloping, although it levels off as trade times become very long. There is also some
limited evidence of nonlinearity.
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3.3 Governance Institutions
The theoretical model suggests that country-level governance characteristics are also likely to be impor-
tant determinants of the incentives facing potentially corrupt agents. More effective governments are
likely to have greater detection and enforcement capacities, while a higher level of citizen involvement
in political life likely correlates with increased risk that a corrupt customs agent will be denounced to the
authorities. Both factors are associated with a higher probability of detection in terms of the theoretical
model presented in the previous section. To capture these dynamics, I use two aggregate indices from the
World Governance Indicators (WGI): government effectiveness, and voice and accountability (Kaufmann
et al., 2008). The first of these indices aggregates perceptions from a wide range of sources on the quality
of public services, the quality and independence of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s policy commitments. The second index aggre-
gates perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens can select their own government, and enjoy
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the media.
The data again provide preliminary results that agree with expectations. Figure 4 discloses a strongly
negative and highly consistent relationship between WEF corruption and WGI government effectiveness
(both in logarithms). A negative relationship is also apparent in Figure 5, which relates WEF corruption to
WGI voice and accountability (again, both in logarithms).4 However, the association between voice and
accountability and corruption is noticeably less consistent than that between government effectiveness
and corruption.
3.4 Cultural Attitudes
Finally, cultural acceptance of corruption is also likely to be a relevant factor. Environments where
corruption is socially acceptable are not likely to be conducive to denunciation of corrupt officials by
private agents, nor to the effective pursuit of those officials by law enforcement agencies. Thus, the
probability that corruption will be detected is lower. In addition, the non-monetary (psycho-social) costs
of corruption are likely to be lower in such environments: the honesty bonus is smaller, in terms of
4All WGI data are rescaled by adding 2.5 prior to taking logarithms. This step is necessary to deal with negative index
values.
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the theoretical model presented above. To take account of these possibilities, I use data on “cultures of
corruption” from Fisman and Miguel (2006) as a proxy for cultural acceptance of corruption, i.e. the
inverse of the cultural value of honesty. Fisman and Miguel (2006) argue that parking infringements
by national diplomats assigned to United Nations missions in New York City are a useful indicator of
the extent to which different cultures tolerate corruption. Since diplomats were immune from pursuit for
parking violations during the time period covered by these data, they did not have any monetary incentive
to comply. The only constraints acting on them were culturally-driven attitudes to rule breaking, which
Fisman and Miguel (2006) argue can provide a useful indicator of the extent to which different cultures
tend to accept corruption.
The association between WEF corruption and diplomatic parking infringements as a proxy for social
norms is also generally in line with expectations (Figure 6, both variables in logarithms). The relationship
is upward sloping, but starts to break down at very high levels of parking violations. It also appears to be
substantially weaker than the bivariate relationships disclosed by the previous Lowess plots.
4 Cross-Country Regressions
The non-parametric results presented in the previous section are suggestive of a set of relationships in
the data that are consistent with expectations and previous work. However, it is important to move to
a fully parametric context to ensure that these findings are robust to the inter-relationships among the
independent variables, and to numerous possible intervening factors that do not appear in the theory.
The workhorse model for this part of the paper is the ordered probit. I use that approach to properly
account for the ordinal nature of the WEF corruption index, which is the primary dependent variable:
a score of four rather than two indicates a higher level of corruption, but it is not possible to conclude
that corruption is twice as high in a country that scores four as in a country that scores two. Since the
reported WEF indices are simple averages of survey responses on a one to seven scale, I round off the
reported figures to the nearest integer. Corruption can therefore fall into one of seven groups, however
only six groups are actually observed in practice: the highest possible score (seven) is not reported for
any country in the sample.
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In the ordered probit context, I treat observed corruptioni in terms of a latent variable corruption∗i that
is a function of the factors discussed above:
corruption∗i = b1 ln(timei) + b2 ln(govt.e f f ect.i) + b3 ln(accountabilityi) + b4 ln(culturei) + ei (2)
Define a set of cutoff points c such that corruption = 0 if corruption∗ ≤ c1, corruption = 1 if c1 <
corruption∗ ≤ c2, and so on. With appropriate normalizations, and assuming that eiis normally dis-
tributed, the set of b parameters and the cutoffs c can be estimated by standard maximum likelihood
techniques.
For robustness checks using WBES corruption data, the dependent variable is the percentage of firms
surveyed reporting that a gift or unofficial payment was asked for or expected to obtain an import license.
I therefore estimate the baseline model using OLS as follows:5
corrupt%i = b1 ln(timei) + b2 ln(govt.e f f ect.i) + b3 ln(accountabilityi) + b4 ln(culturei) + ei (3)
4.1 Baseline Estimation Results
Results for the baseline model using WEF corruption data are reported in column 1 of Table 2, with the
estimated cutoffs suppressed for brevity. All estimated coefficients have the predicted signs from the
theoretical model in Section 2: time, and cultural acceptance of corruption are associated with increased
corruption, whereas government effectiveness and accountability have the opposite effect. The coeffi-
cients on time and government effectiveness are statistically significant at the 1% level, but the remaining
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels.
Standard diagnostics suggest that the baseline model has substantial explanatory power. The highest
predicted probability coincides with the corruption index score actually observed in the data nearly 60%
of the time (Count R2 = 0.577), and the model substantially outperforms the strategy of simply choosing
the most frequently observed outcome as the predicted outcome in each case (Ad justed Count R2 =
5Results are nearly identical if estimation is via a Tobit model with a lower bound at zero and an upper bound at unity, or
the fractional logit model of Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
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0.309). Based on likelihood criteria, the model can be seen to substantially outperform the alternative of
an intercept only model (Pseudo−R2 = 0.348). A test of the joint hypothesis that all slope coefficients





Since ordered Probit coefficients cannot be directly interpreted in terms of elasticities, I examine the
changes in predicted probabilities associated with changes in trade times. Figure 7 shows predicted
cumulative probabilities associated with different values for timei, holding all other variables constant
at their median values. The short dashed line indicates the probability of having a corruption index of
zero or one, the dotted line shows the probability of having an index score of zero, one, or two, and so
on. Moving from left to right on the graph, it is clear that higher trading times exert an economically
meaningful effect on corruption, as the probability of recording a relatively low corruption score, say less
than two, decreases markedly as time increases. At the minimum value for trade time in these data, the
probability of having a corruption index score of two or better is over 80%, whereas at the maximum
value it is less than 20%.
To reinforce these results, Figure 8 presents the predicted probability of being a relatively low corruption
country (index score of one) versus being a relatively high corruption country (index score of four) for
values of time between the sample minimum and maximum. The probability of being a low corruption
country falls from around 50% at the minimum value of time to less than 10% at its maximum, while the
probability of being a high corruption country increases from approximately zero to more than 10% over
the same range. As the confidence intervals in the graph suggest, the changes are statistically significant
in both cases.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents results for the baseline model using WBES corruption data. Results gen-
erally line up well with those from the ordered probit model using WEF data. The coefficient on trade
time is positive and 5% significant, in line with theoretical predictions. Cultural acceptance of corrup-
tion also has the expected positive coefficient, while government effectiveness and accountability have
the expected negative coefficients. Only the coefficient on government effectiveness is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Taking these results together, the baseline estimates clearly support the hypotheses advanced above to
the effect that trade time and cultural acceptance impact positively on corruption prevalence, but that
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government effectiveness and accountability impact negatively. Results line up reasonably well using
two different sources of corruption data, one (WEF) based on perceptions, and the other (WBES) based
on reported behavior by firms. However, given that the effective sample is much smaller for the WBES
data than for the WEF data–74 observations versus 111–the remainder of this section presents additional
results using the WEF data only.6
4.2 Dealing with Endogeneity
Clearly, identification is a major issue in this model. One aspect of the identification problem here is the
need to exclude other country-specific factors that might be driving both trade time and corruption, and I
address that issue below in the context of robustness checks. A second aspect is, of course, the potential
for endogeneity bias. There are a number of possible ways in which concerns regarding endogeneity can
be raised, and I deal with them in turn.
First, it might be thought that the DB trade time data might reflect the faster trade times obtained by
corrupt firms, since such firms may have been included in the DB survey. Thus, an unexpected shock to
corruption prevalence would feed through to faster reported trade times, and tend to bias the coefficient
on trade time towards zero. For the reasons set out in Section 3, it is unlikely that the DB data in fact
suffer from this problem, since they are designed to reflect official times only–the best available proxy of
a trader’s outside option if she decides not to pay speed money. Beyond definitions, however, this is also
an issue that can be addressed empirically, since if the argument put forward in favor of the exogeneity
of DB data is correct, other data collected in a different manner should demonstrate stronger evidence of
a coefficient biased towards zero. I therefore re-run the baseline model using the shortest import times
(averaged by country) reported by survey participants in the LPI/WBES survey discussed above. These
are pure survey data designed to reflect actual experience on the ground, and not “in principle” official
times. Indeed, the results in column 7 of Table 2 strikingly reflect the difference between the potential
endogeneity of this experience measure, and the “in principle” DB measure: the coefficient on time is
much smaller than for the DB data, and is not statistically significant. I interpret these results as providing
6Results based on the WBES data are available on request. They are generally similar to those using the WEF data, except
when very small samples make the regressions uninformative.
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some supporting evidence in favor of the exogeneity of DB trade time data with respect to corruption.
A second way in which the endogeneity issue arises is the argument that bureaucrats might set high
trade times in order to be able to extract rents–a form of the optimal harassment problem examined by
Kaufmann and Wei (1999). To deal with this possibility and the previous one, I use two instrumental
variables strategies. Columns 3-6 of Table 2 present two-step GMM estimates.7 As a first strategy, I
instrument for trade time using DB data on the number of documents that must be completed in order
to comply with border formalities. Since these administrative requirements are determined at a level of
authority higher than that of an individual customs officer, it is less likely that they are subject to the
harassment problem. Similarly, individual officials cannot set centralized paperwork requirements at a
level designed to extract maximum bribes. To over-identify the model, I also include a measure of each
country’s land area, which impacts Doing Business trade times because they take account of internal
transit.
First stage estimates in column 4 suggest that the instruments do a good job of explaining observed
variation in trade time. The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are individually zero





= 0.00). The configuration of coefficient signs is generally sensible, with both trade
documents and internal land area impacting positively on trade time. In addition, the instruments appear
to be valid in the sense of being uncorrelated with the main equation error term, since Hansen’s J fails to





Column 5 presents second stage results, which generally accord with the baseline. The coefficient on
trade time is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Government effectiveness, and cul-
tural tolerance of corruption both have the expected signs; the first of these coefficients is statistically
significant at the 5% level, and the second is marginally significant at the 10% level (p = 0.115).
These instrumental variables results support the results in the rest of the paper, thereby suggesting that
endogeneity would not appear to be a major issue in these data. Indeed, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endo-




= 0.175). It could be objected, however, that in a
7The dependent variable is the same as in the OLS and Tobit regressions. The literature does not disclose an appropriate
IV estimator for the ordered probit model.
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thoroughly corrupt society, central bureaucrats might set the level of trade documentation so as to enable
individual border officials to extract bribes. To deal with this possibility, I follow Djankov et al. (Forth-
coming) and limit the sample to landlocked countries only. Since DB trade time data reflect the total time
required to move goods from the factory to the most accessible port, they include transit through neigh-
boring countries in the case of landlocked countries. Trade time in neighboring countries can therefore be
a valid instrument for trade time in a landlocked country: the two should be strongly correlated because
of the way in which the DB data are constructed, but it is very unlikely that bureaucrats or officials in the
landlocked countries can determine times or procedures in neighboring countries.
Results from this second instrumental variables strategy appear in columns 5-6 of Table 2. Although
they must be treated with caution due to the very small sample size involved, it is nonetheless striking
that they remain remarkably close to the baseline. Trade time has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient (5%), while government effectiveness has a negative and 5% significant coefficient. Cultural
tolerance of corruption has a positive coefficient, but it is statistically insignificant. Voice and account-
ability has the only coefficient with an unexpected sign (positive), but it is statistically insignificant. In
terms of instrument validity, the first stage regression shows that trade time in neighboring countries is
positively and significantly correlated with trade time in landlocked countries: the first stage F-test is
21.57 (p = 0.000). Combined with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test that fails to reject the null




= 0.962), the closeness of these results to the baseline strongly suggests that the
possible endogeneity of trade time with respect to corruption is not a serious problem in these data. It is
important to stress, of course, that this is not a general result applying to all measures of trade time, but a
highly specific one applying to the DB data only.
4.3 Other Robustness Checks
I subject the baseline model to a number of robustness checks to ensure that the above conclusions are
not unduly sensitive to the way in which the model is specified. They cover four dimensions: inclusion
of additional trade policy data (Table 3); use of alternative independent variable sets (Table 4); changes
in the estimation sample (Table 5); and alternative estimation techniques (Table 6).
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4.3.1 Additional Trade Policy Data
There is already a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating that higher and more variable tariffs are
associated with more prevalent corruption (Fisman and Wei, 2004; Dutt, 2008; Dutt and Traca, Forth-
coming). Since tariffs are simply a discriminatory tax, it is not surprising that higher rates should be
associated with more prevalent evasion behavior necessitating the payment of bribes to customs officials.
Similarly, highly variable tariff rates provide an incentive for traders to seek the re-classification of goods
according either to product type or origin, so as to benefit from a lower tax rate. Customs agents are
in a position to provide this kind of service, but will require the payment of a bribe in order to do so.
However, the model in Section 2 abstracts from tariffs and other trade costs to focus on the role of time.
Casual empiricism suggests that countries that are in general less open (i.e., those with higher tariff rates)
will also tend to have slower border crossing times. Indeed, the correlation between DB trade time and
simple average tariffs from TRAINS is 0.441. It is therefore important to exclude the possibility that the
baseline results are really being driven by tariffs. To do this, I re-estimate the model using tariff data
from TRAINS, as well as theory-consistent trade restrictiveness indices (OTRIs) from Kee et al. (2008)
covering tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
Results in Table 3 show that the relationship between trade time and corruption is highly robust to the
inclusion of additional trade policy measures: the coefficient on time remains positive and at least 5%
significant in all regressions, and has a magnitude that is remarkably close to the baseline. Interestingly
in light of previous work, results are very mixed in terms of the coefficients on the various trade policy
variables. TRAINS tariffs (column 1) and the tariff-only OTRI (column 2) have the expected positive
sign, but are statistically insignificant. The tariff and NTB OTRI (column 3) has an unexpected negative
sign, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. However, results in columns 4-5 suggest that the
lack of significance of the trade policy coefficients may be an artifact of the data, perhaps linked to the
difficulty of aggregating tariffs and NTBs across many thousands of product lines, or to the poor quality
of data on NTBs and preferential tariff rates. Blunter measures of tariff rates, i.e. the percentage of tariffs
that can be regarded as “peaks” under alternative UNCTAD definitions, have coefficients that are positive
and statistically significant, in line with previous work (columns 4-5). The percentage of duty free lines
in the national tariff schedule also carries the expected sign (negative), but the coefficient is statistically
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insignificant. Based on these results, I conclude that tariff rates are a possible alternative explanation for
the prevalence of trade related corruption (see also Sequiera and Djankov, 2009), but that they are not
driving the observed relationship between time and corruption: it is highly robust to the inclusion of other
measures of trade policy in the model.
4.3.2 Alternative Independent Variable Sets
In addition to the possible role of trade policy discussed above, it is also important to exclude other factors
that might be driving the association between trade time and corruption. First, I address the argument that
the baseline results might simply be picking up an association between the general level of corruption in a
country, and the general quality of its regulations. To exclude this possibility, I use a placebo strategy. In
column 1 of Table 4, I re-estimate the baseline model using DB data on the time it takes to start a business
in a given country in place of trade time. These data have been widely used in empirical work as a proxy
for the general level of national regulatory burdens (e.g., Helpman et al, 2008). Whereas trade time in the
baseline regression has a positive and 1% significant coefficient, startup time has a slightly positive but
statistically insignificant coefficient (prob = 0.303). It therefore seems unlikely that the baseline results
simply reflect a general correlation between regulatory quality and corruption, but rather contain specific
information as to the relationship between trade time and trade-related corruption.
It could also be argued that a number of categories of excluded country characteristics might be driving
the results. First, I consider economic characteristics. Column 2 of Table 4 includes aggregate GDP and
GDP per capita, as proxies for country size (Azfar and Knack, 2003) and level of economic development
(Treisman, 2000; Ades and Di Tella, 1999) respectively. Column 3 includes the share of trade in GDP,
a common proxy for openness, to account for the constraining effects of international competition on
corruption (Treisman, 2000; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Knack and Azfar, 2003). Column 7 includes
the percentage of oil, minerals, and fuel in total exports, as a proxy for the importance of resource rents
that might tend to promote corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). I find that income level and openness
are negatively associated with corruption prevalence, as expected, but that the coefficients are statistically
insignificant. The coefficients on country size and the extent of resource rents are positive but statistically
insignificant. In all cases, the coefficient on trade time remains positive, statistically significant, and close
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in magnitude to the baseline, which suggests that the key result is not being driven by omitted country-
level economic characteristics.
Next, I consider institutional characteristics as another possible driving force behind both variables: it
could be argued that better institutions lead to more efficient regulation (lower trade times) and reduced
corruption prevalence. Column 5 of Table 4 includes colony dummies, capturing colonization by Britain,
France, Spain, Portugal, and Russia (Treisman, 2000). Column 6 includes dummies for British, French,
Socialist, and Scandinavian legal origins (Treisman, 2000). Column 7 includes dummies for majoritar-
ian electoral rules and presidential regimes (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Column 8 includes
data on the percentage of the population in each country identifying themselves as belonging to a ma-
jor religion (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, Protestantism, and Roman
Catholicism). In all cases, results remain very close to the baseline. In particular, the coefficient on trade
time remains positive, statistically significant, and of relatively stable magnitude. Conditional on all of
the other variables in the model, I find that countries colonized by France tend to have higher levels of
corruption prevalence (marginally significant at the 5% level), but that colonization by other powers does
not have any statistically significant impact. Scandinavian legal origins are strongly associated with lower
levels of corruption (1% significant), but other legal origins do not have a statistically significant impact.
Finally, a majoritarian electoral rule is associated with higher levels of corruption, while the opposite is
true for presidential regimes; however, neither effect is statistically significant. The difference between
these findings and previous results in the literature–in which British colonization and a common law legal
system have, in particular, been associated with less prevalent corruption–can most likely be explained by
the use here of data on cultural and institutional characteristics that theory suggests should directly affect
corruption prevalence. Past work on colonization and legal origins has tended to use those dummy vari-
ables as a means of capturing general institutional characteristics, so it should not be surprising that they
essentially lose statistical significance once explicit measures of institutional development are included.
As a final robustness check with respect to omitted country characteristics, the last column of Table 4
includes continent dummies to account for the possibility of neighborhood effects. It could be argued, for
example, that countries that are geographically close to one another might tend to have similar economic
institutions and approaches to trade facilitation. However, results are once more close to the baseline.
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In this section, I have controlled for country-level economic and institutional determinants of corruption,
based on variable sets used extensively in the existing literature. Taking these results together shows the
association between trade time and trade-related corruption prevalence to be highly robust. It is unlikely
to be driven to a significant degree by omitted country characteristics.
4.3.3 Alternative Country Samples
The baseline estimates include in their sample all countries for which the relevant data are available.
However, there are two dimensions in which sample selection might be an issue. The first stems from the
possibility that there are unobservable characteristics of some country groups that could drive the apparent
relationship between trade time and corruption, or interact with some of the explanatory variables. For
instance, there are suggestions in the literature that the relationship between corruption and economic
activity might be fundamentally different in Asia than in other regions (e.g., Rock and Bonnett, 2004),
which would suggest that the model coefficients might be different from one geographical area to another.
To exclude this possibility in so far as possible, I re-estimate the model excluding four groups of countries
that might be thought to have particular characteristics relevant to the relationship being tested. Results
are in Table 5.
Column 1 excludes high income countries from the sample, on the basis that governance institutions
are particularly strong, and economic regulations particularly developed, in these countries. Column 2
excludes high and upper middle income countries, on the same basis. Column 3 excludes low income
countries due to their presumptively weak institutions and comparatively poor governance. (All groups
are defined according to the World Bank’s country classification.) Column 4 excludes African countries
from the sample, as institutions are particularly weak in some cases, and corruption is known to be
endemic in some parts of the continent. Column 5 excludes Asian countries, for the reason mentioned
above.
In all five cases, the coefficient on trade time remains positive, statistically significant at the 10% level or
better, and of comparable magnitude to the baseline. The only departures from the baseline results are in
Columns 1 and 5 (high income countries excluded; Asian countries excluded), where cultural acceptance
of corruption has an unexpected negative sign, and voice and accountability has an unexpected positive
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sign. However, neither coefficient is statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on voice and
accountability becomes 5% significant once African countries are excluded from the sample, suggest-
ing that its role as a constraint on corrupt behavior may only be relevant for countries with particular
institutional configurations.
The second dimension of sample selection that could be important for these results is the argument that
the collection of corruption perceptions data such as the WEF index tends to focus on countries that are of
particular commercial interest to multinational firms, since the WEF survey is based on executive opin-
ions (cf. Azfar and Knack, 2003). To address this possibility, I use a Heckman sample selection model.
In these estimates, I drop the Fisman and Miguel (2006) proxy for cultural acceptance of corruption since
its availability represents the most serious constraint on the estimation sample. (Re-estimating the base-
line model without that variable produces results that are almost identical, using 115 observations rather
than 111.) To over-identify the Heckman model, I use two data sources. In columns 1-2 of Table 6, I
use a dummy variable equal to unity if a country is included in the World Bank’s LPI sample as a proxy
for the ease of obtaining reliable trade and customs data in particular countries; this variable should be
correlated with the presence or absence of a country from the WEF sample, but should not otherwise
influence observed corruption prevalence. In columns 3-4, I use a dummy variable equal to unity if a
country has a United Nations Mission in New York City, based on the Fisman and Miguel (2006) data,
as a proxy for the ability of countries to have some minimum level of involvement in the international
system. Again, this variable should be correlated with inclusion in the WEF sample–since it suggests that
a country is on the international “radar screen”–but should not otherwise affect corruption prevalence.
Results in columns 1-4 of Table 6 suggest that the excluded variables–inclusion in the LPI sample and
possession of a UN Mission in New York City–do a good job of explaining inclusion in the WEF sample:
both are 1% significant in their respective first stage (selection) regressions. In terms of the second
stage (outcome) regressions, results are in line with the baseline in terms of sign, but only government
effectiveness is statistically significant (1%). The coefficient on trade time is smaller than in the OLS
baseline (Table 6 column 6), and is statistically insignificant; however, the hypothesis that the Heckman
coefficients are equal to the OLS baseline coefficient cannot be rejected at the 5% level in either case.
Moreover, the estimated correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations (ρ̂)
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is not statistically different from zero in either Heckman model. This last result strongly suggests that
sample selection is not a major problem in these data, and that it is appropriate to rely on the baseline
results.
4.3.4 Alternative Estimators
A final dimension of robustness relates to the choice of estimator. First, I examine whether the effect
of trade time on corruption is non-linear, as suggested by Dutt and Traca (Forthcoming) in the case of
tariffs. Column 5 of Table 6 therefore includes trade time in levels and squares. Interestingly, I find some
evidence that nonlinear effects may indeed be present: both coefficients are statistically significant at the
5% level or better. The pattern of coefficients is suggestive of an inverted U relationship between trade
time and corruption. In this dataset, the overall impact of trade time on corruption is always positive, and
only a small handful of observations fall on the downward sloping part of the inverted U. The effect of
trade time on corruption is strongest in Kenya, which has an average trade time of 53.5 days and a WEF
corruption score of 3 out of 7.
All results using WEF data have relied on an ordered probit estimator, and thus on the assumption that the
error term ei is normally distributed. Another possibility is that the error term is log-normally distributed,
in which case an ordered logit would be superior. There is no a priori reason to prefer one assumption
over the other, so I re-estimate the model as an ordered logit. Results in column 5 of Table 6 are very close
to the baseline in all respects, which suggests that little turns on the assumption that is made regarding
the distribution of the error term.
An alternative approach to estimation using the WEF data is to treat them as continuous, rather than
categorical. Since the data point for each country represents the average of responses across a number
of survey participants, results frequently fall between categories, and the analysis thus far has relied on
rounding to sort these averages into groups that reflect the original WEF categories. In columns 6-8 of
Table 6, I therefore re-estimate the model using the raw WEF data in logarithms, i.e. not rounded to
the nearest integer. The first set of estimation results uses OLS, while the second and third use a Tobit
estimator to reflect the existence of a lower bound on the dependent variable at ln(1) = 0 and an upper
bound at ln(7) (column 7), or at the observed minimum and maximum in the data (column 8). The
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coefficient on trade time is positive and statistically significant in all cases. Government effectiveness
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, and cultural tolerance of corruption has a positive
coefficient that is statistically significant in all three cases. Voice and accountability is not statistically
significant in either case, and carries an unexpected positive coefficient in the OLS and second Tobit
regressions.
5 Gravity Regressions
The empirical results presented in Section 4 strongly suggest that, based on cross-country data, trade
times are an important determinant of observed levels of trade-related corruption. Based on the theory
set out in Section 2 and the Appendix, an alternative way of identifying that link is through bilateral
trade data: the effect of time on trade flows depends on the level of corruption present in the trading
environment, so the interaction of time and corruption prevalence should be a statistically significant
determinant of bilateral trade flows. As a complement to the cross-country regression results, I therefore
also estimate a standard gravity model, and test whether or not the interaction term is significant (cf. Dutt
and Traca, Forthcoming).















... + (1−σ)[b1 ln(timei j)+b2 ln(corri j)+b3 ln(timei j)× ln(corri j)]+ ei j (5)
The dependent variable Xi j is aggregate exports from country i to country j.8 The CES elasticity of
substitution among varieties within a sector is σ . The square brackets contain the trade costs function,
which depends on trade time for both countries (timei j), the level of corruption in both countries (corri j),
and the interaction between the two. A set of C control variables is also included, to take account of
standard geographical and historical factors that have been found to influence trade costs in the gravity
8In future work, I intend to complement these results with gravity models using sectoral trade data so as to account for
differences in time sensitivity across different classes of goods (Hummels, 2001; Djankov et al., Forthcoming).
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literature. Distance (as a proxy for transport costs) is the most common example. The ei j term is a
random shock satisfying the usual assumptions.





where Yi is total value added in the exporter, and E j is total expenditure in the importer. The Πi and Pj






Y is a weighted average of trade costs across all of country i’s export markets,
and inward multilateral resistance
(
Pj
)1−σ =∑Ni=1{ [ ]Πi}1−σ YiY is a weighted average of trade costs across
all of country j’s suppliers.9 These terms capture the fact that it is bilateral trade costs relative to the over-
all level of trade costs that matter for bilateral trade flows. Despite their complexity, an appropriate fixed
effects configuration makes it possible to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest using
OLS. An additional advantage of this approach is that the importer fixed effects account for a wide range
of trade barriers such as MFN tariffs, and many NTBs that apply to all exporters equally.
Unfortunately, neither trade time nor corruption data are available on a bilaterally disaggregated basis.
Only country-specific measures are available, but they cannot be included directly in the gravity model
because of collinearity with the importer and exporter fixed effects. I therefore assume that trade time
and corruption in the exporting and importing countries both enter the trade costs function symmetri-


















I estimate the above model using WITS-Comtrade bilateral trade data combined with the same WEF
corruption data and DB trade time data used above. As historical and geographical controls, I use inter-
national distance, a dummy variable identifying dyads with a past colonial link, another dummy identi-
fying dyads with a common historical colonizer, a dummy for geographical contiguity, and a dummy for
countries that share the same official language. All historical and geographical controls are taken from
the CEPII distance dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2006).
9The terms in square brackets refer to the trade costs function, which is in square brackets in equation (4).
10In future versions of this paper, I intend to check the robustness of these gravity model results to possible concerns that
trade time and corruption might be endogenous to trade flows. At this stage, I treat these variables as exogenous. Djankov et
al. (Forthcoming) show that this is a highly plausible assumption for the DB trade time data, while the leading contributions in
the trade and corruption literature treat the corruption level as exogenous to bilateral trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002;
Dutt and Traca, Forthcoming).
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Column 1 of Table 7 presents a gravity model including trade time and controls only, for purposes of
comparison with the results of Djankov et al. (Forthcoming). As in that paper, I find a negative and sta-
tistically significant impact of trade time on bilateral trade. However, the estimated elasticity in column
1 (-2) is considerably greater in absolute value than the magnitude reported by Djankov et al. (Forthcom-
ing) (-0.5). Part of the difference is due to methodology and data: I use a fixed effects approach to capture
multilateral resistance, whereas Djankov et al. (Forthcoming) estimate using first differences; as a conse-
quence, I measure time bilaterally, whereas they only include time data for exporters. The effectiveness
of their model in accounting for multilateral resistance depends crucially on the unverifiable assump-
tion that similar countries (i.e., members of the same regional agreement and income group) face similar
overall levels of trade costs. Fixed effects, on the other hand, necessarily capture multilateral resistance
in the dimensions implied by theory. In addition to these methodological issues, it also appears that the
time data have been substantially revised by the World Bank: the estimation sample used here covers 152
exporters, whereas Djankov et al. (Forthcoming) only had data on all variables for 98 exporters. The data
points for individual countries have been revised in a few cases too, sometimes substantially.
Column 2 introduces WEF corruption data into the gravity model. In line with past results (e.g., Anderson
and Marcouiller, 2002), I find that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of bilateral
trade. The effect is quantitatively important, with an elasticity of -2, and is statistically significant at
the 1% level. Moreover, in column 3 I find that the interaction between corruption and trade time has
a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, the bilateral trade data tend
to suggest that corruption and trade time do not have strictly independent effects on trade, but instead
interact to produce an overall negative impact. This finding is directly in line with predictions from the
theoretical model presented in Section 2 and the Appendix, and also reflects results reported by Dutt and
Traca (Forthcoming) in the case of tariffs. In terms of quantitative importance, a 10% increase in trade
time is associated with a 14.488% fall in bilateral trade in a corruption free country (corrupti = 1), but
with a 15.252% fall in a country with rampant corruption (corrupti = 7). Although the difference between
the two elasticities is relatively small–of the order of 5%–it is nonetheless economically significant.
Finally, columns 4-5 of Table 7 re-estimate the interaction model using a Heckman sample selection
estimator. I assume that missing Comtrade data are indicative of zero trade flows between the relevant
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country pairs.11 Helpman et al. (2008) provide a theoretical basis for using this type of approach to
estimate a gravity model when the trade matrix contains a substantial number of zero entries. I use the
standard Heckman correction to account for firm self-selection into foreign markets, but I do not apply
the additional correction they propose to deal with firm heterogeneity. As in Helpman et al. (2008), I
over-identify the model by including DB data on the costs of starting a firm–a proxy for the fixed costs of
market entry–in the selection (trade propensity) equation, but not in the outcome (trade flow) equation.
In this case, the Heckman model does not produce substantially different results from OLS. The outcome
equation in column 4 includes negative and statistically significant coefficients on trade time, corruption,
and their interaction. The same is true of the trade time (statistically insignificant) and interaction co-
efficients (1% significant) in the selection (probit) equation. However, the corruption coefficient in that
equation is positive and statistically significant. The reasons behind that result are deserving of additional
analysis, but for present purposes it suffices to highlight that regardless of the sign of the corruption term,
the interaction remains negative, and thus consistent with the cross-country regression results above.
In any case, the Heckman results should be regarded as a robustness check only: the correlation be-
tween the error terms in the selection and outcome equations is very weak and statistically insignificant




= 0.352), which suggests that sample selection is not a major problem
in these data.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided some of the first empirical evidence on the importance of trade time as a deter-
minant of trade-related corruption. I find that longer trade times are significantly associated with higher
levels of trade-related corruption, and that this association is robust to the use of a wide variety of inde-
pendent variables, country samples, and estimation methods. The baseline results are obtained using a
corruption perception index, but they also hold up using survey data on the percentage of firms required
to make a gift in connection with trade transactions. In terms of magnitude, this paper’s results are sug-
gestive of a modest but significant impact of trade time on corruption, and of those factors together on
11Just over 10% of the sample (1352 observations) falls into this category.
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bilateral trade. As an approximation, OLS estimates of the baseline cross-country regression suggest that
increasing trade time by one day in the median country (27.5 days) is associated with an increase in its
WEF corruption score of about 1%. From the estimated parameters of the gravity model, it can be seen
that a a 10% increase in trade time is associated with a 14.488% fall in bilateral trade in a corruption
free country, but with a 15.252% fall in a country with rampant corruption; this represents a difference of
around 5% in the two elasticities.
On a policy level, these results are interesting for at least two reasons. First, they expand the range of
policy instruments available for anti-corruption efforts to include trade facilitation in its broadest sense,
namely measures that reduce the time and cost of moving goods across borders. This link is particu-
larly important in weak institutional environments, since many alternative policies aimed at controlling
corruption at the border, such as improved detection and enforcement or investments in human capital
and training, are extremely difficult to implement over the short- to medium-term. Indeed, it is doubtful
whether countries in which such reforms can be implemented quickly and effectively should be consid-
ered as having weak institutions in the first place. Experience suggests that reforms to border administra-
tion and trade facilitation can be successfully implemented through a staged process that is feasible even
in comparatively weak institutional environments (e.g., McLinden, 2006). Improved trade facilitation
can therefore be a useful short-term step in helping control corruption at the border
Second, international agencies involved in providing financing and technical assistance to improve trade
facilitation in client countries are increasingly required to face up to the challenges posed by corruption
in those countries. As an example, the controversy in 2006-2007 over the World Bank’s role in dealing
with governance and corruption issues is illustrative of an important tension (see World Bank, 2007).
On the one hand, multilateral agencies can experience pressure from donor countries and international
civil society groups to cut back on aid in poorly governed and/or corrupt environments. But there is
also a strong argument that, at least in some cases, on-going engagement and investment can be a way
of helping bring about governance reforms over the longer term. This paper’s results tend to support a
limited version of that point of view: improved trade facilitation requires extensive financial support and
technical assistance, but it is a clear example of a situation in which foreign aid can be targeted in such
a way as to reduce the importance of private rents and the incidence of corruption (cf. Rose-Ackerman,
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1997).
In terms of future research in this area, there are a number of additional directions that could usefully
be explored. One interesting and important question relates to the firm-level determinants of corruption.
Svensson (2003) uses a survey of Ugandan firms to show that not all agents in the same market report
having to pay bribes, and that among bribe payers there is considerable variation in the amount paid.
Casual empiricism using similar data available across multiple countries through the WBES suggests that
this finding is by no means unique to the data considered by Svensson (2003), and applies equally well
to trade-related corruption. Explaining this variation remains key to developing a better understanding of
the way in which incentives structure corrupt behavior on a micro-level.
Clearly, the phenomenon of speed money is not limited to international trade transactions, but can also
apply to other situations in which time-sensitive individuals seek access to government services. Obtain-
ing business permits, dealing with fiscal authorities, and having utilities connected are examples of other
areas in which corrupt payments for faster service might be an issue. Data are available from sources
such as DB and WBES on the extent of these problems in different countries, and the way in which firms
respond to them. It would be instructive for future work to replicate the results from this paper using data
for other types of government activities.
References
Ades, Alberto; and Rafael Di Tella, 1999, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption”, American Economic
Review, 89(4), 982-993.
Anderson, James E.; and Eric Van Wincoop, 2003, “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Puzzle”, American Economic Review, 93(1), 170-192.
Anderson, James E.; and Douglas Marcouiller, 2002, “Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical
Investigation”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), 342-352.
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; and Suryadipta Roy, 2006, “Corruption and Trade Protection: Evidence from
Panel Data”, Working Paper No. 2007-022A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Bardhan, Pranab, 2006, “The Economist’s Approach to Corruption”, World Development, 34(2), 341-
348.
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; and Seung Jick Yoo, 2007, “Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public
Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries”, Review of Development Economics, 11(3), 507-517.
30
Campos, Nauro F.; and Francesco Giovannoni, 2006, “Lobbying, Corruption, and Political Influence”,
Discussion Paper No. 2313, IZA.
Das, Samantak; and Sanjib Pohit, 2006, “Quantifying Transport, Regulatory, and Other Costs of Indian
Overland Exports to Bangladesh”, World Economy, 29(9), 1227-1242.
Djankov, Simeon; Caroline Freund; and Cong S. Pham, Forthcoming, “Trading on Time”, Review of
Economics and Statistics.
Dutt, Pushan, 2009, “Trade Protection and Bureaucratic Corruption: An Empirical Investigation”, Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, 42(1), 155-183.
Dutt, Pushan; and Daniel Traca, Forthcoming, “Corruption and Bilateral Trade Flows: Extortion or
Evasion?”, Review of Economics and Statistics.
Evans, Carolyn L.; and James Harrigan, 2005, “Distance, Time, and Specialization: Lean Retailing in
General Equilibrium”, American Economic Review, 95(1), 292-313.
Fisman, Raymond; and Edward Miguel, 2006, “Cultures of Corruption: Evidence from Diplomatic Park-
ing Tickets”, Working Paper No. 12312, NBER.
Fisman, Raymond; and Shang-Jin Wei, 2004, “Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ’Missing
Imports’ in China”, Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 471-500.
Fisman, Raymond; and Shang-Jin Wei, 2007, “The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncov-
ering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques”, Working Paper No. 13446, NBER.
Grossman, Gene M.; and Elhanan Helpman, 1994, “Protection for Sale”, American Economic Review,
84(4), 833-850.
Helpman, Elhanan; Marc J. Melitz; and Yona Rubinstein, 2008, “Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Part-
ners and Trading Volumes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 441-487.
Hummels, David, 2001, “Time as a Trade Barrier”, Working Paper, http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/time3b.pdf.
Kaufmann, Daniel; and Shang-Jin Wei, 1999, “Does ’Grease Money’ Speed Up the Wheels of Com-
merce?”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2254, The World Bank.
Kaufmann, Daniel; Aart Kraay; and Massimo Mastruzzi, 2008, “Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654, World Bank.
Kee, Hiau-Looi; Alessandro Nicita; and Marcelo Olarreaga, 2008, “Import Demand Elasticities and
Trade Distortions”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4), 666-682.
Knack, Stephen; and Omar Azfar, 2003, “Trade Intensity, Country Size, and Corruption”, Economics of
Governance, 4, 1-18.
Kunicova, Jana; and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2005, “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption”, British Journal of Political Science, 35, 573-606.
Long, J. Scott; and Jeremy Freese (2005), Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes Using Stata, 2nd
edition, College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Lui, Francis T., 1985, “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery”, Journal of Political Economy, 93(4),
760-781.
Mauro, Paulo, 1995, “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681-712.
Mayer, Thierry; and Soledad Zignago, 2006, “Notes on CEPII’s Distance Measures”, Working Paper,
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf.
31
McLinden, Gerard, 2006, “Needs, Priorities, and Costs Associated with Technical Assistance and Capac-
ity Building for Implementation of a WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: A Comparative Study Based
on Six Developing Countries”, Working Paper, The World Bank.
Olken, Benjamin A., 2007, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”,
Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 200-249.
Olken, Benjamin A., Forthcoming, “Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality”, Journal of Public
Economics.
Olken, Benjamin A.; and Patrick Barron, Forthcoming, “The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence
from Trucking in Aceh”, Journal of Political Economy.
Papke, Leslie E.; and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 1996, “Econometric Methods for Fractional Response
Variables with an Application to 401(k) Plan Participation Rates”, Journal of Applied Econometrics,
11(6), 619-632.
Rock, Michael T.; and Heidi Bonnett, 2004, “The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the
East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth, and Investment”, World Development,
32(6), 999-1017.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 2007, Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington, DC: Institute for Inter-
national Economics.
Sandholtz, Wayne; and William Koetzle, 2000, “Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democ-
racy, and Trade”, International Studies Quarterly, 44, 31-50.
Sequeira, Sandra; and Simeon Djankov, 2009, “On the Waterfront: An Empirical Study of Corruption in
Ports”, Working Paper, http://www.gov.harvard.edu/student/sequeira/Corruption.pdf.
Svensson, Jakob, 2003, “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of
Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 207-230.
Svensson, Jakob, 2005, “Eight Questions about Corruption”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3),
19-42.
Treisman, Daniel, 2000, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study”, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 76, 399-457.
World Bank, 2007, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption,
Washington, DC: World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/comments/governancefeedback/gacpaper-
03212007.pdf.
Appendix: A Theoretical Model of Speed Money
As in Evans and Harrigan (2005), the model’s timing is as follows:
1. Customs agents decide whether or not to be corrupt, and choose the “gift” required in order to
secure quick passage of goods through customs.
2. Firms decide how much to produce.
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3. Period 1 demand is realized, and firms decide how much to sell in period 1. Unsold production is
carried over costlessly to period 2.
4. Fast firms produce again. Slow firms do not.
5. Period 2 demand is realized, and firms decide how much to sell in period 2. Unsold production is
discarded.
The Slow Firm’s Problem
The slow firm is a monopolist with inverse demand as in Evans and Harrigan (2005):
p = a−bs (6)
where p is price, s is sales, and a and b are parameters. Demand in each period is uncertain, with
{a1,a2} ∈ {aH ,aL} where aH > aL, and E [a] = a. Since the setup is identical, the slow firm’s profit-



















where q is the total quantity produced, and subscripts indicate time periods.12 Labor is perfectly homo-
geneous and mobile between sectors, and its supply is perfectly elastic at the prevailing wage rate, which
I normalize to unity.



















where V (a) = ρa2H +(1−ρ)a2L−a2 is the variance of the demand parameter a.
The Fast Firm’s Problem
The fast firm is also a monopolist, with inverse demand function identical to the slow firm’s. The total
gift inclusive cost of producing and shipping one unit of output is 1+ γg, where γ is the proportion of
customs agents who are corrupt, and g is the amount of the gift that must be paid for fast service. The
fast firm’s optimal production and sale plan closely follows the equivalent set of equations in Evans and
12See the unpublished appendix to Evans and Harrigan (2005) for details as to the conditions under which this type of




















− (qF1 − sF1 ) (11)
The fast firm takes corruption prevalence γ and the amount of the gift g as given, although they are in fact
chosen endogenously by optimizing customs agents (see below).





















In the absence of corruption (γ = 0 or g = 0), the fast firm would have higher ex ante expected profits




]−E [piS]= V (a)
8b
> 0 (13)
The Customs Agents’ Problem
Customs agents can be of two types: honest (no acceptance of gifts), or corrupt (acceptance of gifts). An
honest customs agent earns the economy-wide wage (1) with certainty each period. In addition, she earns
an “honesty bonus” h, under the assumption that agents gain some kind of subjective satisfaction from
following rules. In the interests of analytical tractability, I assume that the honesty bonus is drawn from
a uniform distribution with cumulative distribution function F (h) = h
h
, and support [0,h].
By contrast, a corrupt customs agent earns the economy-wide wage plus the amount of any gift g extracted
from traders. However, corrupt agents face a probability δ of detection. If an agent is found to be corrupt,
he loses his job and receives an income of zero.
In equilibrium, utility maximizing customs agents equalize the returns from corruption and honesty such
that:
1+h = (1−δ )(1+g) (14)
Define h∗ as the minimum honesty bonus required for a customs agent to remain honest for given g and
δ , such that agents with h ≥ h∗ are honest, and those with h < h∗ are corrupt. It follows immediately
from above that:
h∗ = g−δ −δg (15)




where the last equality follows from the distributional assumption for the honesty bonus made above.






Ignoring possible indirect effects, it is obvious from inspection that a higher probability of detection tends
to reduce the proportion of corrupt officials ( ∂γ∂δ = −1+gh < 0). A higher level of gifts has the opposite
effect, however, since ∂γ∂g =
1−δ
h
> 0. Finally, an increase the average level of the honesty bonus–which
could be interpreted as indicative of a culture of honesty–tends to reduce the proportion of corrupt officials




In equilibrium, corrupt customs officers cannot require a gift g in excess of the difference in ex ante
expected profits between the fast and slow firms. To simplify the problem, I assume that customs officers
have full bargaining power, and thus that they can extract the full difference in ex ante expected profits
as a gift. This approach means that I can solve the model by finding a gift g∗ that equalizes expected ex












First, I solve for (1+ γg∗) and retain only the solution that is less than a (expected total demand):

















8a2−12a−V (a)+4) 12 −2h(8a2−12a−V (a)+4) 12 −4adh−4h} 12]
(20)
Provided that demand a has a mean a sufficiently large relative to its variance V (a) and the other pa-
rameters, the equilibrium gift g∗ must be positive. Although the solution itself and comparative statics
based on it are difficult to interpret in detail, that same condition ensures that it is at least possible to draw








8a2−12a−V (a)+4)− 12 ×(
d2+4dh+4ah+2dh
(














8a2−12a−V (a)+4) 12 −2h(8a2−12a−V (a)+4) 12 −4adh−4h} 12]> 0
(22)
Thus, an increase in the variance of demand a is associated with higher bribe payments. This effect is
highly intuitive, since the difference in ex ante expected profits between the fast and slow firms depends
positively on the variance of demand, and that difference is captured in full by the corrupt customs
agents through their capacity to extract gifts. Interestingly, an increase in the local culture of honesty
is associated with a higher gift payment, which might seem surprising at first glance. However, this
outcome reflects the fact that honesty is valued to some extent by all agents, and a higher average level
means that a larger gift is required to overcome the extra utility gained from being honest. Comparing the
effect of cultural honesty on the level of the gift versus the proportion of customs agents who are corrupt
brings out an interesting tension: a higher average level of honesty bonus results in a lower proportion of
corrupt officials (ignoring indirect effects), but those agents who are corrupt receive larger gifts.
Speed, Corruption, and Trade
The model can also say something about the effects that speed and corruption jointly have on trade
flows. I treat sales as synonymous with trade in this section, since the model setup can equally well be
interpreted as capturing domestic production and overseas sales with zero transport costs.
To see the effect of corruption on trade, I compare total expected sales of a fast firm in a corrupt environ-
ment (sF ) to those of a fast firm in a non-corrupt environment (s˜F ):











The reduction in sales due to corruption is therefore s˜F − sF = γgb > 0. However, the parameters γ and
g–and thus the size of the corruption effect on trade–both depend on the difference in ex ante expected
profits between fast and slow firms, and thus on the extent of the time delays that can be reduced or








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Corruption data - WEF (perceptions; in logarithms) vs. WBES (% of firms reporting a “gift”










0 .5 1 1.5
Corruption (WEF)
Corruption (WBES) Fitted values
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Figure 6: Non-parametric (Lowess) regression of corruption on parking infringements by New York City
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1. Only countries with a strictly positive number of parking violations are included. This drops 20
observations from the dataset.
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1. Predicted cumulative probabilities computed at 100 equidistant points between the minimum and
maximum values of the natural logarithm of time.
2. All other variables are held constant at their median values.
3. Software due to Long and Freese (2005).
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1. Predicted probabilities for corruption index scores of one and four (solid lines) computed at 100
equidistant points between the minimum and maximum values of the natural logarithm of trade
time. Upper and lower bounds refer to the estimated 95% confidence interval.
2. All other variables are held constant at their median values.
3. Software due to Long and Freese (2005).
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